The French first employment contract: Efficient screening device or Kleenex contract?

Mehmet Bac*, Serife Genc

*Bu çalışma için yazışmadan sorumlu yazar

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1 Atıf (Scopus)

Özet

The controversial novelty in the French Labor Law reform, withdrawn in April 2006, was a contract form under which employers could dismiss young workers on probation without justification. Proponents argued that the reform would improve screening and boost employment whereas opponents dubbed it the "Kleenex contract." We show that the new contract can produce an incentive to dismiss even suitable workers but that this harmful effect could be mitigated by instituting public ratings of firms according to their propensity to dismiss young workers. Informed workers could then respond to job offers according to firms' layoff records, which in turn would restore promotion incentives and efficient screening.

Orijinal dilİngilizce
Sayfa (başlangıç-bitiş)77-88
Sayfa sayısı12
DergiJournal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie
Hacim98
Basın numarası1
DOI'lar
Yayın durumuYayınlandı - Eyl 2009
Harici olarak yayınlandıEvet

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