Özet
Optimal resource allocation in security has been a significant challenge for critical infrastructure protection. Numerous studies use game theory as the method of choice, because of the fact that an attacker can often observe the defender's investment in security and adapt his choice of strategies accordingly. However, most of these models do not explicitly consider deterrence, with the result that they may lead to wasted resources if less investment would be sufficient to deter an attack. In this paper, we assume that the defender is uncertain about the level of defensive investment that would deter an attack, and use the target-oriented utility to optimize the level of defensive investment, taking into account the probability of deterrence.
Orijinal dil | İngilizce |
---|---|
Sayfa (başlangıç-bitiş) | 35-46 |
Sayfa sayısı | 12 |
Dergi | Reliability Engineering and System Safety |
Hacim | 136 |
DOI'lar | |
Yayın durumu | Yayınlandı - Nis 2015 |
Harici olarak yayınlandı | Evet |
Bibliyografik not
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