Representation in multi-issue delegated bargaining

Shourjo Chakravorty*

*Bu çalışma için yazışmadan sorumlu yazar

Araştırma sonucu: Dergiye katkıMakalebilirkişi

1 Atıf (Scopus)

Özet

Delegated bargaining over multiple issues of varying sizes is a frequent occurrence and happens during such contexts as real estate sales and political representation. Past work has shown that while simultaneously bargaining over two issues, it is in the best interest of an individual to choose a representative with identical preferences as herself. By allowing the sizes of the two issues to vary, this paper uses a two-issue, two-player Rubinstein bargaining game to show that an individual is best served by selecting a representative whose preferences closest resemble her bargaining rival's preferences. It is also found that in some instances depending on the size of the issues the individual will be indifferent when choosing between a representative with identical preferences and another with different preferences to bargain on her behalf.

Orijinal dilİngilizce
Makale numarası20170100
DergiB.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Hacim19
Basın numarası1
DOI'lar
Yayın durumuYayınlandı - 2019

Bibliyografik not

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston.

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