TY - JOUR
T1 - Representation in multi-issue delegated bargaining
AU - Chakravorty, Shourjo
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston.
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - Delegated bargaining over multiple issues of varying sizes is a frequent occurrence and happens during such contexts as real estate sales and political representation. Past work has shown that while simultaneously bargaining over two issues, it is in the best interest of an individual to choose a representative with identical preferences as herself. By allowing the sizes of the two issues to vary, this paper uses a two-issue, two-player Rubinstein bargaining game to show that an individual is best served by selecting a representative whose preferences closest resemble her bargaining rival's preferences. It is also found that in some instances depending on the size of the issues the individual will be indifferent when choosing between a representative with identical preferences and another with different preferences to bargain on her behalf.
AB - Delegated bargaining over multiple issues of varying sizes is a frequent occurrence and happens during such contexts as real estate sales and political representation. Past work has shown that while simultaneously bargaining over two issues, it is in the best interest of an individual to choose a representative with identical preferences as herself. By allowing the sizes of the two issues to vary, this paper uses a two-issue, two-player Rubinstein bargaining game to show that an individual is best served by selecting a representative whose preferences closest resemble her bargaining rival's preferences. It is also found that in some instances depending on the size of the issues the individual will be indifferent when choosing between a representative with identical preferences and another with different preferences to bargain on her behalf.
KW - delegated bargaining
KW - multi-issue bargaining
KW - simultaneous bargaining
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85046012387&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1515/bejte-2017-0100
DO - 10.1515/bejte-2017-0100
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85046012387
SN - 2194-6124
VL - 19
JO - B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
JF - B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
IS - 1
M1 - 20170100
ER -