Özet
We consider rationing problems where the claims are state contingent. Before the state is realized individuals submit claims for every possible state of the world. A rule distributes resources before the realization of the state of the world. We introduce two natural extensions of the proportional rule in this framework, namely, the ex-ante proportional rule and the ex-post proportional rule, and then we characterize them using standard axioms from the literature.
Orijinal dil | İngilizce |
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Sayfa (başlangıç-bitiş) | 229-246 |
Sayfa sayısı | 18 |
Dergi | International Journal of Game Theory |
Hacim | 47 |
Basın numarası | 1 |
DOI'lar | |
Yayın durumu | Yayınlandı - 1 Mar 2018 |
Bibliyografik not
Publisher Copyright:© 2017, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany.
Finansman
We characterize the ex-ante proportional rule by NARAI and NARAS combined with Continuity, and No Award for Null Players. To characterize the ex-post proportional rule, we borrow Independence axiom from the Expected Utility Theory. This axiom says that by mixing two lotteries with a third one, the rationing rule remains unaffected by the choice of the third lottery. By replacing NARAS with the Independence Axiom, and adding Symmetry, we obtain the characterization of the ex-post proportional rule. We would like to thank our advisor, Hervé Moulin, for several helpful comments and remarks. Discussions with Anna Bogomolnaia, Youngsub Chun, Ruben Juarez, Juan Moreno-Ternero, Arunava Sen, and William Thomson have been of great help. The valuable comments of the Associate Editor and two anonymous referees have greatly improved our paper. We thank Graham Brownlow and David Seymour for their help with proof-reading. Sinan Ertemel gratefully acknowledges support from “TÜB˙TAK 2232 Grant 115C030”. Rajnish Kumar acknowledges the British Council grant “UGC-UKIERI 2016-17-059”.
Finansörler | Finansör numarası |
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NARAI | |
NARAS | |
British Council | UGC-UKIERI 2016-17-059 |