Özet
We study the identification and estimation of large network games in which individuals choose continuous actions while holding private information about their links and payoffs. Extending the framework of Galeotti et al., we build a tractable empirical model of such network games and show that the parameters in individual payoffs are identified under large-market asymptotics in which the number of individuals increases to infinity on a single large network. We then propose a semiparametric two-step M-estimator for these individual payoffs and demonstrate its good finite-sample performance in simulations.
| Orijinal dil | İngilizce |
|---|---|
| Sayfa (başlangıç-bitiş) | 411-432 |
| Sayfa sayısı | 22 |
| Dergi | International Economic Review |
| Hacim | 67 |
| Basın numarası | 2 |
| DOI'lar | |
| Yayın durumu | Yayınlandı - May 2026 |
| Harici olarak yayınlandı | Evet |
Bibliyografik not
Publisher Copyright:© 2026 The Author(s). International Economic Review published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of The Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Osaka Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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