Coalition governments and comparative constitutional design

Daniel Diermeier; Hülya Eraslan; Antonio Merlo

doi:10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00223-9

Coalition governments and comparative constitutional design

Daniel Diermeier
, Hülya Eraslan
, Antonio Merlo^*

^*Bu çalışma için yazışmadan sorumlu yazar

Northwestern University
University of Pennsylvania
University of Pennsylvania School of Arts and Sciences
Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

Araştırma sonucu: Dergiye katkı › Makale › bilirkişi

29 Atıf (Scopus)

Özet

In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model which we use to investigate the effects of specific institutional features of parliamentary democracy on the formation and dissolution of coalition governments. We illustrate our methodology by presenting the results of two (counterfactual) experiments of comparative constitutional design.

Orijinal dil	İngilizce
Sayfa (başlangıç-bitiş)	893-907
Sayfa sayısı	15
Dergi	European Economic Review
Hacim	46
Basın numarası	4-5
DOI'lar	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00223-9
Yayın durumu	Yayınlandı - 2002
Harici olarak yayınlandı	Evet

Belgeye Erişim

10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00223-9

Diğer Dosyalar ve Linkler

Link to publication in Scopus

Alıntı Yap

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title = "Coalition governments and comparative constitutional design",

abstract = "In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model which we use to investigate the effects of specific institutional features of parliamentary democracy on the formation and dissolution of coalition governments. We illustrate our methodology by presenting the results of two (counterfactual) experiments of comparative constitutional design.",

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T1 - Coalition governments and comparative constitutional design

AU - Diermeier, Daniel

AU - Eraslan, Hülya

AU - Merlo, Antonio

PY - 2002

Y1 - 2002

N2 - In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model which we use to investigate the effects of specific institutional features of parliamentary democracy on the formation and dissolution of coalition governments. We illustrate our methodology by presenting the results of two (counterfactual) experiments of comparative constitutional design.

AB - In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model which we use to investigate the effects of specific institutional features of parliamentary democracy on the formation and dissolution of coalition governments. We illustrate our methodology by presenting the results of two (counterfactual) experiments of comparative constitutional design.

KW - Bicameralism

KW - Constitutions

KW - Government dissolution

KW - Government formation

KW - Minority coalitions

KW - Political stability

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0036266895

U2 - 10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00223-9

DO - 10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00223-9

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0036266895

SN - 0014-2921

VL - 46

SP - 893

EP - 907

JO - European Economic Review

JF - European Economic Review

IS - 4-5

ER -

Coalition governments and comparative constitutional design

Özet

Belgeye Erişim

Diğer Dosyalar ve Linkler

Parmak izi

Alıntı Yap