A structural model of government formation

Daniel Diermeier; Hülya Eraslan; Antonio Merlo

doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00389

A structural model of government formation

Daniel Diermeier^*
, Hülya Eraslan
, Antonio Merlo

^*Bu çalışma için yazışmadan sorumlu yazar

Northwestern University
University of Pennsylvania
University of Pennsylvania School of Arts and Sciences

Araştırma sonucu: Dergiye katkı › Makale › bilirkişi

113 Atıf (Scopus)

Özet

In this paper we estimate a bargaining model of government formation in parliamentary democracies. We use the estimated structural model to conduct constitutional experiments aimed at evaluating the impact of institutional features of the political environment on the duration of the government formation process, the type of coalitions that form, and their relative stability.

Orijinal dil	İngilizce
Sayfa (başlangıç-bitiş)	27-70
Sayfa sayısı	44
Dergi	Econometrica
Hacim	71
Basın numarası	1
DOI'lar	https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00389
Yayın durumu	Yayınlandı - 2003
Harici olarak yayınlandı	Evet

Belgeye Erişim

10.1111/1468-0262.00389

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Alıntı Yap

@article{6b899fe467c7460095be96c0b97ecf89,

title = "A structural model of government formation",

abstract = "In this paper we estimate a bargaining model of government formation in parliamentary democracies. We use the estimated structural model to conduct constitutional experiments aimed at evaluating the impact of institutional features of the political environment on the duration of the government formation process, the type of coalitions that form, and their relative stability.",

keywords = "Bargaining, Coalitions, Comparative constitutional design, Government dissolution, Government formation, Political stability",

author = "Daniel Diermeier and H{\"u}lya Eraslan and Antonio Merlo",

year = "2003",

doi = "10.1111/1468-0262.00389",

language = "English",

volume = "71",

pages = "27--70",

journal = "Econometrica",

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publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd",

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TY - JOUR

T1 - A structural model of government formation

AU - Diermeier, Daniel

AU - Eraslan, Hülya

AU - Merlo, Antonio

PY - 2003

Y1 - 2003

N2 - In this paper we estimate a bargaining model of government formation in parliamentary democracies. We use the estimated structural model to conduct constitutional experiments aimed at evaluating the impact of institutional features of the political environment on the duration of the government formation process, the type of coalitions that form, and their relative stability.

AB - In this paper we estimate a bargaining model of government formation in parliamentary democracies. We use the estimated structural model to conduct constitutional experiments aimed at evaluating the impact of institutional features of the political environment on the duration of the government formation process, the type of coalitions that form, and their relative stability.

KW - Bargaining

KW - Coalitions

KW - Comparative constitutional design

KW - Government dissolution

KW - Government formation

KW - Political stability

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0037273448

U2 - 10.1111/1468-0262.00389

DO - 10.1111/1468-0262.00389

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0037273448

SN - 0012-9682

VL - 71

SP - 27

EP - 70

JO - Econometrica

JF - Econometrica

IS - 1

ER -

A structural model of government formation

Özet

Belgeye Erişim

Diğer Dosyalar ve Linkler

Parmak izi

Alıntı Yap