Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences

Sinan Ertemel; Levent Kutlu; M.  Remzi Sanver

doi:10.1007/s00355-015-0872-9

Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences

Sinan Ertemel^*
, Levent Kutlu
, M. Remzi Sanver

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Economics

Georgia Institute of Technology
Istanbul Bilgi University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

A resolute social choice correspondence is a social choice rule which maps preference profiles into sets of mutually compatible outcomes. We consider a fairly large class of resolute social choice correspondences and characterize the strong Nash equilibrium outcomes of their voting games in terms of a generalization of the Condorcet principle. Our findings generalize those of Sertel and Sanver (Soc Choice Welf 22:331–347, 2004) who address the same question in a more restricted framework.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	187-201
Number of pages	15
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	45
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0872-9
Publication status	Published - 23 Jun 2015

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© 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

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Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences

Abstract

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