The Effect of Entry Regulation on Process Innovation in the Swiss Mail Industry

Helmut M. Dietl; Andreas Grütter; Martin Lutzenberger; Cátia Felisberto; Matthias Finger

doi:10.1007/BF03399248

The Effect of Entry Regulation on Process Innovation in the Swiss Mail Industry

Helmut M. Dietl^*, Andreas Grütter, Martin Lutzenberger, Cátia Felisberto, Matthias Finger

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We develop an industry specific model of price competition with product differentiation to analyze the effect of entry regulation on process innovation in the Swiss mail industry. We consider the four most prominent scenarios: Regulated monopoly, end-to-end competition, worksharing without bypass, and work-sharing with bypass. Based on model calibration with data from the Swiss letter market, we find that the incentives to invest in process innovations decrease with deregulation. However, even accounting for this fact, the efficiency gains of a partial liberalization, i.e. worksharing, ensure an increase in social welfare.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	37-55
Number of pages	19
Journal	Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics
Volume	144
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03399248
Publication status	Published - Jan 2008
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2008, Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics.

Keywords

L51
L87
end-to-end competition
entry regulation
mail industry
process innovation
work-sharing

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1007/BF03399248

Cite this

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title = "The Effect of Entry Regulation on Process Innovation in the Swiss Mail Industry",

abstract = "We develop an industry specific model of price competition with product differentiation to analyze the effect of entry regulation on process innovation in the Swiss mail industry. We consider the four most prominent scenarios: Regulated monopoly, end-to-end competition, worksharing without bypass, and work-sharing with bypass. Based on model calibration with data from the Swiss letter market, we find that the incentives to invest in process innovations decrease with deregulation. However, even accounting for this fact, the efficiency gains of a partial liberalization, i.e. worksharing, ensure an increase in social welfare.",

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author = "Dietl, {Helmut M.} and Andreas Gr{\"u}tter and Martin Lutzenberger and C{\'a}tia Felisberto and Matthias Finger",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2008, Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics.",

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doi = "10.1007/BF03399248",

language = "English",

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T1 - The Effect of Entry Regulation on Process Innovation in the Swiss Mail Industry

AU - Dietl, Helmut M.

AU - Grütter, Andreas

AU - Lutzenberger, Martin

AU - Felisberto, Cátia

AU - Finger, Matthias

PY - 2008/1

Y1 - 2008/1

N2 - We develop an industry specific model of price competition with product differentiation to analyze the effect of entry regulation on process innovation in the Swiss mail industry. We consider the four most prominent scenarios: Regulated monopoly, end-to-end competition, worksharing without bypass, and work-sharing with bypass. Based on model calibration with data from the Swiss letter market, we find that the incentives to invest in process innovations decrease with deregulation. However, even accounting for this fact, the efficiency gains of a partial liberalization, i.e. worksharing, ensure an increase in social welfare.

AB - We develop an industry specific model of price competition with product differentiation to analyze the effect of entry regulation on process innovation in the Swiss mail industry. We consider the four most prominent scenarios: Regulated monopoly, end-to-end competition, worksharing without bypass, and work-sharing with bypass. Based on model calibration with data from the Swiss letter market, we find that the incentives to invest in process innovations decrease with deregulation. However, even accounting for this fact, the efficiency gains of a partial liberalization, i.e. worksharing, ensure an increase in social welfare.

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KW - L87

KW - end-to-end competition

KW - entry regulation

KW - mail industry

KW - process innovation

KW - work-sharing

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DO - 10.1007/BF03399248

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VL - 144

SP - 37

EP - 55

JO - Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics

JF - Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics

IS - 1

ER -

The Effect of Entry Regulation on Process Innovation in the Swiss Mail Industry

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

UN SDGs

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