Target-oriented utility theory for modeling the deterrent effects of counterterrorism

Vicki M. Bier; Fuat Kosanoglu

doi:10.1016/j.ress.2014.11.006

Target-oriented utility theory for modeling the deterrent effects of counterterrorism

Vicki M. Bier^*
, Fuat Kosanoglu

^*Corresponding author for this work

University of Wisconsin

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Optimal resource allocation in security has been a significant challenge for critical infrastructure protection. Numerous studies use game theory as the method of choice, because of the fact that an attacker can often observe the defender's investment in security and adapt his choice of strategies accordingly. However, most of these models do not explicitly consider deterrence, with the result that they may lead to wasted resources if less investment would be sufficient to deter an attack. In this paper, we assume that the defender is uncertain about the level of defensive investment that would deter an attack, and use the target-oriented utility to optimize the level of defensive investment, taking into account the probability of deterrence.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	35-46
Number of pages	12
Journal	Reliability Engineering and System Safety
Volume	136
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2014.11.006
Publication status	Published - Apr 2015
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 9 Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure
SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

Keywords

Decision analysis
Reliability
Risk analysis
Utility theory

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10.1016/j.ress.2014.11.006

Cite this

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abstract = "Optimal resource allocation in security has been a significant challenge for critical infrastructure protection. Numerous studies use game theory as the method of choice, because of the fact that an attacker can often observe the defender's investment in security and adapt his choice of strategies accordingly. However, most of these models do not explicitly consider deterrence, with the result that they may lead to wasted resources if less investment would be sufficient to deter an attack. In this paper, we assume that the defender is uncertain about the level of defensive investment that would deter an attack, and use the target-oriented utility to optimize the level of defensive investment, taking into account the probability of deterrence.",

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AU - Bier, Vicki M.

AU - Kosanoglu, Fuat

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AB - Optimal resource allocation in security has been a significant challenge for critical infrastructure protection. Numerous studies use game theory as the method of choice, because of the fact that an attacker can often observe the defender's investment in security and adapt his choice of strategies accordingly. However, most of these models do not explicitly consider deterrence, with the result that they may lead to wasted resources if less investment would be sufficient to deter an attack. In this paper, we assume that the defender is uncertain about the level of defensive investment that would deter an attack, and use the target-oriented utility to optimize the level of defensive investment, taking into account the probability of deterrence.

KW - Decision analysis

KW - Reliability

KW - Risk analysis

KW - Utility theory

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84919712121

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DO - 10.1016/j.ress.2014.11.006

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VL - 136

SP - 35

EP - 46

JO - Reliability Engineering and System Safety

JF - Reliability Engineering and System Safety

ER -

Target-oriented utility theory for modeling the deterrent effects of counterterrorism

Abstract

Bibliographical note

UN SDGs

Keywords

Access to Document

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