Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures

Hülya Eraslan; Andrew McLennan

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.005

Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures

Hülya Eraslan^*, Andrew McLennan

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

18 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Dutta et al. (Econometrica 69 (2001) 1013) (Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton-DJLeB) initiate the study of manipulation of voting procedures by a candidate who withdraws from the election. A voting procedure is candidate stable if this is never possible. We extend the DJLeB framework by allowing: (a) the outcome of the procedure to be a set of candidates; (b) some or all of the voters to have weak preference orderings of the candidates. When there are at least three candidates, any strongly candidate stable voting selection satisfying a weak unanimity condition is characterized by a serial dictatorship. This result generalizes Theorem 4 of DJLeB.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	29-54
Number of pages	26
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	117
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.005
Publication status	Published - Jul 2004
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Arrow's theorem
Candidate stability
Candidate withdrawal
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
Political economy
Voting

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10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.005

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abstract = "Dutta et al. (Econometrica 69 (2001) 1013) (Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton-DJLeB) initiate the study of manipulation of voting procedures by a candidate who withdraws from the election. A voting procedure is candidate stable if this is never possible. We extend the DJLeB framework by allowing: (a) the outcome of the procedure to be a set of candidates; (b) some or all of the voters to have weak preference orderings of the candidates. When there are at least three candidates, any strongly candidate stable voting selection satisfying a weak unanimity condition is characterized by a serial dictatorship. This result generalizes Theorem 4 of DJLeB.",

keywords = "Arrow's theorem, Candidate stability, Candidate withdrawal, Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, Political economy, Voting",

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AU - Eraslan, Hülya

AU - McLennan, Andrew

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AB - Dutta et al. (Econometrica 69 (2001) 1013) (Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton-DJLeB) initiate the study of manipulation of voting procedures by a candidate who withdraws from the election. A voting procedure is candidate stable if this is never possible. We extend the DJLeB framework by allowing: (a) the outcome of the procedure to be a set of candidates; (b) some or all of the voters to have weak preference orderings of the candidates. When there are at least three candidates, any strongly candidate stable voting selection satisfying a weak unanimity condition is characterized by a serial dictatorship. This result generalizes Theorem 4 of DJLeB.

KW - Arrow's theorem

KW - Candidate stability

KW - Candidate withdrawal

KW - Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

KW - Political economy

KW - Voting

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JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

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ER -

Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures

Abstract

Keywords

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