Skepticism and objective contexts: A critique of DeRose

Giovanni Mion

doi:10.1163/22105700-02021061

Skepticism and objective contexts: A critique of DeRose

Giovanni Mion^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Sociology

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper I contrast my contextualist account of Cartesian skepticism with Keith DeRose's account. I agree with DeRose that when the Cartesian skeptic and her opponent meet in the same context, their claims are truth-value-less. But I agree with him on the basis of a different conception of context sensitivity. According to DeRose, the content of context sensitive expressions in general, and of knowledge in particular, is personally indicated. By contrast, I think that the content of context sensitive expressions in general, and of knowledge in particular, is objectively determined by the goals of the conversation and the environment in which the conversation takes place.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	119-129
Number of pages	11
Journal	International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Volume	3
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-02021061
Publication status	Published - 2013

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2013.

Keywords

Cartesian skepticism
Closure principle for knowledge
Epistemic contextualism
Single scoreboard semantics

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abstract = "In this paper I contrast my contextualist account of Cartesian skepticism with Keith DeRose's account. I agree with DeRose that when the Cartesian skeptic and her opponent meet in the same context, their claims are truth-value-less. But I agree with him on the basis of a different conception of context sensitivity. According to DeRose, the content of context sensitive expressions in general, and of knowledge in particular, is personally indicated. By contrast, I think that the content of context sensitive expressions in general, and of knowledge in particular, is objectively determined by the goals of the conversation and the environment in which the conversation takes place.",

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AB - In this paper I contrast my contextualist account of Cartesian skepticism with Keith DeRose's account. I agree with DeRose that when the Cartesian skeptic and her opponent meet in the same context, their claims are truth-value-less. But I agree with him on the basis of a different conception of context sensitivity. According to DeRose, the content of context sensitive expressions in general, and of knowledge in particular, is personally indicated. By contrast, I think that the content of context sensitive expressions in general, and of knowledge in particular, is objectively determined by the goals of the conversation and the environment in which the conversation takes place.

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ER -

Skepticism and objective contexts: A critique of DeRose

Abstract

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Keywords

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