Representation in multi-issue delegated bargaining

Shourjo Chakravorty*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)


Delegated bargaining over multiple issues of varying sizes is a frequent occurrence and happens during such contexts as real estate sales and political representation. Past work has shown that while simultaneously bargaining over two issues, it is in the best interest of an individual to choose a representative with identical preferences as herself. By allowing the sizes of the two issues to vary, this paper uses a two-issue, two-player Rubinstein bargaining game to show that an individual is best served by selecting a representative whose preferences closest resemble her bargaining rival's preferences. It is also found that in some instances depending on the size of the issues the individual will be indifferent when choosing between a representative with identical preferences and another with different preferences to bargain on her behalf.

Original languageEnglish
Article number20170100
JournalB.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2019

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston.


  • delegated bargaining
  • multi-issue bargaining
  • simultaneous bargaining


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