Hintikka on the “Kant–Frege View”: A Critical Assessment

Giovanni Mion*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In “Kant on Existence, Predication, and the Ontological Argument” (1981), Hintikka argues that the so-called “Kant–Frege view” (i.e., the claim that Kant is a forerunner of Frege’s treatment of existence) is wrong, for its supporters erroneously assume that for Kant ‘is’ is ambiguous. In this paper, I will first critically evaluate Hintikka’s arguments against the Kant–Frege view. Then, I will attempt to prove that Kant’s claim that existence is not a real predicate and Frege’s claim that existence is a quantifier are in fact logically interdependent. Finally, I will use the Kant–Frege view in order to reconcile the various claims that Kant makes about existence.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)171-178
Number of pages8
JournalLogica Universalis
Volume13
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2019

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

Keywords

  • existential generalization
  • existential quantifier
  • Hintikka
  • The Kant–Frege view

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