Abstract
In “Kant on Existence, Predication, and the Ontological Argument” (1981), Hintikka argues that the so-called “Kant–Frege view” (i.e., the claim that Kant is a forerunner of Frege’s treatment of existence) is wrong, for its supporters erroneously assume that for Kant ‘is’ is ambiguous. In this paper, I will first critically evaluate Hintikka’s arguments against the Kant–Frege view. Then, I will attempt to prove that Kant’s claim that existence is not a real predicate and Frege’s claim that existence is a quantifier are in fact logically interdependent. Finally, I will use the Kant–Frege view in order to reconcile the various claims that Kant makes about existence.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 171-178 |
Number of pages | 8 |
Journal | Logica Universalis |
Volume | 13 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jun 2019 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2018, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
Keywords
- existential generalization
- existential quantifier
- Hintikka
- The Kant–Frege view