Empirical analysis of collusive behaviour in the Turkish deposits market

Resul Aydemir*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper examines the degree of cartel formation in the Turkish banking industry for the period 2002–2011. Taking up a conjectural variation approach, it is found that Turkish banks appear to have exercised collusive pricing during the sample period. This result is a reflection of the fines imposed by the Competition Authority on March 8, 2013 after its recent investigation of the banking industry. It was also found that the size distribution of banking institutions is significant in explaining the differences in conduct patterns, and in particular, smaller banks have acted more collusively than larger ones. The estimation results also demonstrated that there has been less collusive behaviour among Turkish banks following the 2008 global financial crisis.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)527-538
Number of pages12
JournalEconomic Research-Ekonomska Istrazivanja
Volume27
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2014 The Authors.

Keywords

  • Competition
  • Conjectural variation
  • Market structure
  • Turkish banking

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Empirical analysis of collusive behaviour in the Turkish deposits market'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this