Dynamic Legislative Bargaining

This article surveys the theoretical literature on legislative bargaining with endogenous status-quo. These are the legislative bargaining situations in which in each period a new policy is decided and the policy implemented in the event of no agreement is endogenously determined by the outcome of bargaining in the previous period. After describing a general framework, we discuss bargaining over redistributive policies, bargaining over spatial policies, existence issues, efficiency issues, and open questions. This survey was prepared for the book “Bargaining: Current Research and Future Directions”, Emin Karagözoğlu and Kyle Hyndman (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan. We thank the editors for their invitation and an anonymous referee for insightful feedback on an earlier version. Due to space limitations, we do not discuss or even cite a number of related works. A longer version with a more comprehensive references can be found at Eraslan et al. (47). Eraslan: Department of Economics, Rice University and Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, [email protected]. Evdokimov: Department of Economics, Rice University, [email protected]. Zápal: CERGE-EI, [email protected].