Coalition governments and comparative constitutional design

Daniel Diermeier; Hülya Eraslan; Antonio Merlo

doi:10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00223-9

Coalition governments and comparative constitutional design

Daniel Diermeier, Hülya Eraslan, Antonio Merlo^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

27 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model which we use to investigate the effects of specific institutional features of parliamentary democracy on the formation and dissolution of coalition governments. We illustrate our methodology by presenting the results of two (counterfactual) experiments of comparative constitutional design.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	893-907
Number of pages	15
Journal	European Economic Review
Volume	46
Issue number	4-5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00223-9
Publication status	Published - 2002
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Bicameralism
Constitutions
Government dissolution
Government formation
Minority coalitions
Political stability

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10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00223-9

Cite this

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AU - Diermeier, Daniel

AU - Eraslan, Hülya

AU - Merlo, Antonio

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AB - In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model which we use to investigate the effects of specific institutional features of parliamentary democracy on the formation and dissolution of coalition governments. We illustrate our methodology by presenting the results of two (counterfactual) experiments of comparative constitutional design.

KW - Bicameralism

KW - Constitutions

KW - Government dissolution

KW - Government formation

KW - Minority coalitions

KW - Political stability

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DO - 10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00223-9

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VL - 46

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EP - 907

JO - European Economic Review

JF - European Economic Review

IS - 4-5

ER -

Coalition governments and comparative constitutional design

Abstract

Keywords

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